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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
“Argumentation Schemes in Dialogue” by Chris Reed and Douglas Walton is, as 
expected, a nice work on dialogue logic. The article extends the existing systems of 
dialogue logic and makes them suitable for analyzing and evaluating argumentation 
schemas of plausible reasoning. Even though much work in argumentation theory has 
recently been devoted to arguments that cannot be classified as either deductive or 
inductive, the existing systems of dialogue logic are still constrained by principles of 
deductive reasoning. The rules of inference that define acceptable reasoning in these 
dialogue models still presuppose only the rules of deductive logic.  
According to Walton (1997), plausible reasoning cannot be reconstructed as either 
deductive or inductive reasoning, since the premises in plausible arguments are typically 
statements based on incomplete information; their reliability is thus always open to 
discussion.  The conclusion does not necessarily (nor with certain probability) follow 
from the premises; but premises still provide good reasons for accepting the conclusion. 
As Reed and Walton describe it in “Argumentation Schemes in Dialogue”, when relying 
on plausible reasoning, we move “to a plausible hypothesis under conditions of 
uncertainty and lack of knowledge”. 
The importance of Reed and Walton’s Argumentation Scheme Dialogue (ASD) is 
even greater when we realize that a large part of reasoning, not only in everyday 
conversation but also in many theoretical contexts of acquiring beliefs or knowledge, is 
actually grounded on plausible arguments.  
Two items in Reed and Walton’s ASD encourage some critical reflection. The 
first one is about their meaning of a (temporarily) defeated argument. The other one is 
about the commitment rule (v) of ASD.  
 
2.  WHAT IS A DEFEATED ARGUMENT? 
 
According to Reed and Walton, an argument is (temporarily) defeated as soon as the 
respondent asks one of the critical questions corresponding to the pertinent argumentation 
scheme. That is curious: asking a critical question does not provide enough information 
for evaluating an argument as temporarily defeated.  
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In trying to illuminate the meaning of a defeated argument, we follow Bowel and 
Kemp (2005, p. 229) and Krabbe (1999, p. 10) to clarify that an inductively or plausibly 
strong argument is defeated for a person at a given time when the person reasonably 
believes the premises, but still reasonably rejects the conclusion that otherwise follows 
from the premises, by means of additional information expressed through active criticism. 
The principles of active criticism as discussed in Krabbe (1999, p.10) correspond to what 
Reed and Walton call the “Pose C-exception move” in ASD. A (temporarily) defeated 
argument would therefore be either:  
(1) an argument for which the hearer has successfully formulated an active criticism, 
that is, posed an exception critical question of the corresponding scheme A 
(making thus a ‘Pose exception C’ dialogue move) and which is followed either 
by the speaker’s statement ‘not-C’ or ‘No commitment C’; or 
(2) an argument for which the hearer has posed an assumption critical question of the 
corresponding scheme A (making thus a dialogue move ‘Pose assumption C’) and 
which is followed either by the speaker’s statement ’not-C’ or ‘No commitment 
C.  
 
Contrary to that, Reed and Walton suggest that an argument is temporarily 
defeated as soon as the hearer has asked one of the pertinent critical questions. It seems, 
however, that arguments which are under the analysis and evaluation process, in 
situations in which critical questions are still to be answered, would rather correspond to 
what we may call criticized arguments. (A better term would actually be ‘challenged 
arguments’, but it should probably be saved for dialogue moves based on what Reed and 
Walton in the Locution rules of ASD call challenges).  
Reed and Walton claim themselves that the role of critical questions is to shift the 
burden of proof in a dialogue. Critical questions may therefore initiate the process of 
seeking information so as to be able to evaluate an argument, but do not in themselves 
provide enough information to evaluate the argument as temporarily defeated, as Reed 
and Walton would suggest. Assuming that would involve a risk of making an appeal to 
ignorance fallacy. 
 
3. WHICH COMMITMENTS TO WITHDRAW WHEN REASONING PLAUSIBLY? 
 
Commitment Rule (v) of ASD puts forward that “No commitment may be withdrawn by 
the hearer that is shown by the speaker to be an immediate consequence of statements 
that are previous commitments of the hearer”. This rule is taken from Walton’s CB 
deductive dialogue system (Walton, 1984:133-135). Nevertheless, if ASD should be 
suitable for plausible reasoning and the corresponding argumentation schemes, 
commitment rule (v) should be modified. It otherwise limits the advantages that 
commitment rule (iv) and the dialogue rule R4 are bringing into ASD and transforms 
ASD back into a model suitable only for deductive reasoning.  
Commitment rule (v) as formulated in ASD implies two problematic assumptions, 
namely:  
(1) that the hearer and the speaker both have enough information for answering all the 
critical questions of the corresponding argumentative scheme; and  
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(2) that the speaker and the hearer share the same set of commitments (commitment 
information); the speaker (therefore) knows all the hearer’s commitments (and 
vice versa).   
 
Do these assumptions really correspond to the ways in which a dialogue based on a 
plausible argumentation scheme works? Let us think about each of them.  
Ad 1: Reed and Walton agree that argumentation schemas typically “represent 
defensible inferences of a kind that are useful heuristics for moving to a plausible 
hypothesis under conditions of uncertainty and lack of knowledge”. Let us consider the 
argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion and the corresponding critical 
questions. The conditions of uncertainty apply to the incompleteness of information in 
each of the premises of the argumentation scheme. This makes the answers to some 
critical questions incomplete, if not impossible. 
For instance, in many situations of everyday conversation we use arguments from 
expert opinion because we are not authorities in a given field. This implies that the 
speaker would seldom be able to answer the Backup Evidence Question, if asked, due to 
the lack of the expertise needed for knowing or/and analyzing the evidence that should 
support the expert’s assertion. The same follows for the incompleteness of the 
information necessary to answer the Consistency Question.  
One problem with ASD is that it does not specify the principles of evaluating 
arguments from expert opinion, in situations of incomplete information. What degree and 
kind of information would be sufficient for providing the speaker and/or hearer with a 
strong/weak argument from expert opinion? In other words, how many of the critical 
questions, and in which way, should be answered to obtain a strong/weak argument from 
expert opinion?  
Another problem is that the answers to critical questions may provide the speaker 
and the hearer with conflicting information. Additionally, the aspects that the critical 
questions address are not equally important for evaluating the argument. Furthermore, the 
speaker and the hearer may have different preferences as concerns the importance of 
these aspects. For instance, the expert on whose opinion the argument relies may be a 
credible expert source, but personally unreliable. Or, the expert may satisfy all the 
conditions suggested by the critical questions, except that the expert’s claim A is 
inconsistent with what the other experts assert. The ASD does not reflect on that 
(distinctive) feature of plausible reasoning and does not introduce any kind of logical 
procedure to guide evaluation of an argument from expert opinion in such situations. 
Ad 2: The hearer and the speaker usually do not assume the same information 
when analyzing and evaluating an argument from expert opinion. It is quite possible that 
the hearer has more information relevant for the analysis and the evaluation of the 
argument, than the speaker (or the other way round). Moreover, the speaker (or the 
hearer, respectively) may not be aware of that. Thus the speaker and the hearer may start 
a dialogue with different sets of commitments and may be unaware of that.  
This feature of plausible reasoning, together with the characteristics discussed 
above suggests that, at least in certain cases, it would be necessary to allow the hearer to 
withdraw the statements that are shown by the speaker to be immediate consequences of 
statements that are previous commitments of the hearer. Reed and Walton’s commitment 
rule (v) needs a modification that would better suit these characteristics of plausible 
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reasoning. The proper use of the argumentation scheme assumed by rule R4 in 
combination with the ‘Pose C’ move assumed by rule R5 is otherwise impossible. The 
example considered in the following section shows the need of modifying ASD 
commitment rule (v), with regard to the principles of plausible reasoning discussed 
above.     
 
4. AN EXAMPLE 
 
Stefan (the speaker): It is not good to eat sugar! 
Håkan (the hearer): Oh, You are in the mood of proclaiming today, aren’t you? Why is it 
not good? 
Stefan: Because it has bad effects on body and produces a disturbing changes in mood 
that initiate a strong need for sugar consumption, which at the end produces a 
kind of sugar addiction. Arthur Basie concludes that in his article published 
recently in Healthy Living.   
Håkan: Why do I have to believe that eating sugar is not good for me only because Arthur 
Basie says so?  
Stefan: Do you remember the program for nutrition therapy against high blood pressure 
that started in 2000 at Göteborg Health Centre and had extremely effective 
results?  
Håkan: Yes.  
Stefan: Well, that program is based on Arthur Basie’s theory on nutrition, healthy living 
and immunology and all these positive results suggest that he is credible as an 
expert source.  
Håkan: Oh, yes, Basie is without doubt credible as an expert source, not only due to the 
high blood pressure therapy program.  
Stefan: And then, would you agree that nutrition, healthy living and immunology are 
relevant for having some clue about the consequences of eating sugar? 
Håkan: What a Socratic dialogue! Yes, I agree. 
Stefan: And Arthur Basie is really reliable as a person, isn’t he? Moreover, he rapports in 
his new book about many other research programs that came to the same 
conclusions. 
Håkan: Yes, I know that. I have myself read through a number of other research rapports 
on the subject. Indeed, they all suggest the same as it concerns sugar eating. We 
should definitely avoid it as much as possible. 
Stefan: But then, why do you still eat all these chocolate cakes with ice cream several 
times a week if you agree that we should avoid eating sugar? We have just 
realized that the statement against sugar eating is a kind of your commitment, 
right? Moreover, we have seen that this commitment is an immediate 
consequence of statements that are your previous commitments! Therefore, 
according to Reed and Walton, you may not withdraw the commitment that we 
should avoid eating sugar as much as possible, except you do not withdraw some 
of the previous commitments that have the new commitment as the immediate 
consequence.  
Håkan: Who are Reed and Walton now? 
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Stefan: They are experts in dialogue logic and they have, in their Argumentation Scheme 
Dialogue, suggested a commitment rule which corresponds to what I have just 
explained to you.  
Håkan: I am not interested in jumping into analyzing a new argument from expert 
opinion at the moment. Look, I may keep all the previous commitments from 
which my claim that we should not eat sugar is the immediate consequence, and 
still withdraw the claim from the set of my commitments and thus continue to eat 
all these chocolate cakes. 
Stefan: That is inadmissible! Do you have any logical explanation for doing so? 
Håkan: Yes, I do. Have you read about the new research on consequences of sugar eating 
by Lester Davis? 
Stefan: No, I actually do not know anything about it. 
Håkan: Well it is in accordance with the results of Arthur Basie’s research and the similar 
results of all the other experts, but it suggests something more that makes me 
ready to withdraw the commitment that we should not eat sugar. Lester Davis’ 
results suggest namely that sugar stimulates intellectual work. And intellectual 
activities have extremely good consequences for human body and health. 
According to that aspect of health, we should eat sugar. Since enjoying 
intellectual work is more important to me than worrying about the disturbing 
changes in mood and the slight addicted behavior that sugar eating may produce, 
I am going to continue eating my chocolate cakes - and with ice cream.  
Stefan: Oh, I see. Indeed, it seems logical that you may withdraw the commitment that 
we should not eat sugar, even if it has been shown to be an immediate 
consequence of your previous commitments. 
 
link to paper
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